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  1Projected Economic Growth in China and India: 
 
The Role of Demographic Change* 
 
Abstract: 
  Within the next decade, China’s labour force will begin to contract, while that of India 
will expand faster than its population.  Relative labour abundance will bring higher capital 
returns and an increasing share of global FDI to India.  Yet China may relax its One Child 
Policy further and India’s fertility could follow the pattern elsewhere in Asia and decline faster 
than expected.  These linkages are explored using a global demographic sub-model that is 
integrated with an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global economic model in which regional 
households are disaggregated by age and gender.  Even with a two-child-policy, China’s growth 
is projected to slow in future with India becoming the fastest growing economy in the world on 
the strength of its continued population expansion.  While GDP depends positively on fertility 
and per capita income negatively in both countries, the price of more GDP growth in terms of 
lost per capita income is lower in China than in India, a result that depends critically on India’s 
initially higher fertility, its higher youth dependency and the age-gender pattern of its 
participation rates.  India therefore has considerably more to gain, at least in per capita terms, 




  As the third decade of Chinese economic reforms draws to an end, its remarkable growth 
performance appears almost unstoppable.  Between 1995 and 2005, GDP and per capita GDP 
grew at average annual rates of 8.8% and 8.0% respectively.  The central government’s ambition 
to raise the level of GDP in 2020 to four times the level in 2000, which requires an annual 
growth rate of 7.2%, seems well within reach.  India’s economic reforms began in earnest in the 
early 1990s, and like China’s, signal a systemic shift towards an increasingly market-driven 
economy.  Despite the fact that India’s average annual GDP growth performance of 6% in the 
last decade was enviable by virtually any standards, Indian authorities have increased their 
growth target to 8%, indicating some degree of disappointment with the growth rates achieved 
in the first decade of reforms (Ahluwalia, 2002).  In both countries, there is no question that 
achieving high and sustainable rates of GDP growth is a major policy objective. 
In China, a potential threat to GDP growth in the future is its low fertility and the 
associated ageing of its population.  The United Nations (2005) projects a rise in the proportion 
of over 60s in China’s population from 10% in 2000 to 20% in 2025, and further to 31% by 
2050.  Meanwhile, the proportion of the population of working age (15-59 years) is predicted to 
fall from 65% in 2000 to 62% in 2025 and 53% in 2050.  By 2020, the growth of the working 
age population will be negative, suggesting that GDP growth will suffer as a consequence.  
India, by contrast, began the millennium with a much younger population than China.  Its aged 
population was only 7.5% of the total population in 2000 and is predicted to rise to 12% in 2025 
  2and 21% in 2050.  The share of India’s working age population will rise from 58% in 2000 to a 
peak of 64% in 2035.  India’s relatively youthful population and high fertility rate suggest that 
its “demographic dividend” could continue for another two decades at least, in stark contrast 
with China’s. 
The demographic transition to slower population growth and the associated ageing of 
China’s population have been profoundly affected by the One Child Policy.  Yet fertility rates 
would have declined anyway, affected as they have been in China’s Asian neighbours by 
urbanisation, female education, increased labour force participation rates and the improved life-
expectancy of new-born children.  Indeed, while the associated fall in fertility has not been as 
spectacular as China’s, India’s fertility rates have also declined steadily since the 1970s.  
Critically, however, the different age structures of the world’s two most populous countries has 
elicited different population policy responses: in China, with a transition to a declining and 
ageing population in prospect, there is now public discussion of more relaxed family planning 
policies, while in India, with a rapidly growing population and high youth dependency rates, the 
focus continues to be on fertility reduction (Xinhuanet, 2005; Padmadas et al., 2005). 
In this paper the linkages between demographic change and economic growth in China 
and India are explored using a new global demographic sub-model that is integrated with an 
adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global economic model in which regional households are 
disaggregated by age and gender.  The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical and practical links between demographic change and economic growth in China and 
India.  In Section 3 the demographic sub-model and the GTAP-Dynamic economic model are 
described.  The composite model provides a means to examine quantitatively the interactions 
between demographic change and economic performance.  Section 4 constructs a baseline 
scenario for the global economy through to 2030, while Section 5 presents alternative fertility 
scenarios for the two nations.  In China, a transition to a two-child-policy is considered, while in 
India, the alternative scenario explores the possibility that fertility could decline more quickly 
than in the baseline.  Simply put, while more rapid population growth in China might ultimately 
ease some of the burden of an ageing population and contribute to higher rates of growth in 
GDP, it is shown to be contradictory to the goal of delivering improvements in real per capita 
income.  For India, the benefits of reduced fertility, in terms of real per capita income, are 
shown to be substantial.  Conclusions are offered in Section 6. 
 
  32. Demographic Change and Economic Growth 
At a basic level, faster population growth should yield stronger GDP growth, but lower per 
capita income growth.  This expectation stems from the standard Solow-Swan model of growth 
that realistically incorporates diminishing factor returns, but less realistically assumes constant 
labour participation rates across an ageless population.  This ensures that faster population 
growth generates faster-growing labour forces, which yield steady states with lower levels of 
capital per worker and hence lower per capita income.
1  In reality, changing populations have 
changing age distributions, and this alters average labour force participation rates and youth and 
aged dependency ratios.  In a developing country with large numbers of dependent children, a 
fall in fertility not only slows population growth, it also reduces the total dependency ratio and 
raises the proportion of the working aged population.  Income per capita is boosted by the fall in 
dependency so that the basic Solow-Swan result is strengthened, giving rise to a “demographic 
dividend”.
2  As Bloom and Canning (2005a) point out, however, the per capita income boost is 
not an automatic consequence of changes in the age distribution, but instead depends on 
economic policies as they affect labour market flexibility and education. 
In addition to these supply-side effects of demographic change on growth, changes in age 
distributions also have demand side implications.  Lower fertility raises the average age of the 
population, changing the scale and product composition of final consumption to more strongly 
reflect the preferences of adults and the aged.  More importantly, the associated rise in the 
proportion of working aged tends to raise the share of households’ disposable incomes devoted 
to saving.  In a developing country, following a fertility decline, this tends to increase the 
average saving rate.  If investment is also raised, the demographic dividend is further bolstered.  
Higgins (1998) notes that the demographic “centre of gravity” for investment demand occurs 
earlier in the age distribution than for savings supply, because the former is most closely related 
to the youth share in the population – via its connection to labour force growth – while the latter 
is most closely related to the share of mature adults – via their retirement needs.  The divergence 
between these two centres of gravity means that the effect of the demographic transition on 
savings and investment depends on the country’s openness to capital flows.  The more open is 
the capital account the more investment and capital growth depends on the economy’s 
comparative performance and not, narrowly, on its saving behaviour.  Thus, as China and India 
trend toward more open capital accounts, the effects of ageing on their saving rates are likely to 
                                                 
1 See Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), and the detailed analytical review offered by Pitchford (1974: Ch.4). 
2 See Bloom and Williamson (1998) for a generic discussion of the demographic dividend in developing countries, 
Bloom and Canning (2003 and 2005a) for recent reviews, Bloom et al. (2000) for a detailed examination of the 
implications for Asia, and Cai and Wang (2005) for implications for China.   
  4diminish.
3  Indeed, in affecting growth performance, the supply-side effects of demographic 
change, acting as they do through the size of the labour force, tend to dominate demand side 
changes to average saving rates and to the product composition of consumption.
4
Complexities arise, however, when the interdependence of fertility, longevity, labour force 
participation and saving rates are fully accounted for.  In one theoretical study, Bloom et al. 
(2005) predict that improvements in health and longevity will result in rising natural retirement 
ages (increased aged labour force participation) but declining average saving rates, the latter 
occurring because longer working lives reduce the need to save for retirement in each successive 
age cohort.  However, this may not be observed in practice, particularly if policy regimes 
prevent or discourage later retirement, in which case increased longevity will require higher 
average savings rates in order to finance a longer retirement period.  As Alan Greenspan (2004) 
points out, higher payroll taxes to finance ageing-related problems exacerbate the slow-down in 
the growth of labour supply by diminishing the returns to work, while “policies promoting 
longer working life could ameliorate some of the potential demographic stresses” (p. 782). 
Additional complexities include the link between labour force growth, capital returns and 
foreign investment.  While the attraction of investment from abroad boosts GDP growth, the 
new capital returns are repatriated and the contribution to per capita income growth then 
depends on real wage changes.
5  Faster labour force growth necessarily slows real wage growth 
even while it attracts foreign investment.  Also dependent on the growth path of real wages is 
the pattern of migration.  Both India and China are substantial suppliers of (mainly skilled) 
migrants to the rest of the world.  Growth due to boosted fertility, and its slower real wage 
growth path, would raise skilled emigration and reduce skill endowments in both.  Finally, any 
labour-supply-driven acceleration of GDP growth tends to shift the terms of trade adversely by 
raising output relative to consumption and exports relative to imports.
6  This also tends to weigh 
down the growth of per capita income.  While the integrated model of demography and 
economic growth to be presented in the next section does not activate all of these interactions, it 
offers scope to experiment with alternative assumptions about each. 
Fertility is obviously one of the key determinants of demographic change and, according to 
Padmadas et al. (2005), it is the main driving force of population change (in absolute terms) in 
both China and India.  They also argue that fertility rates are the most uncertain component of 
                                                 
3 The problems that arise in the closed capital markets that are common in developing countries are weak 
intermediation and hence mal-distributed investment and a low level of embodied technical change.  These are just 
two of the reasons for the switch to openness that is under way in China and India. 
4 See, for example, Tyers and Shi (2007). 
5 See Tyers and Golley (2006). 
6 Equivalently, lower wage costs relative to other regions tend to cause real depreciation. 
  5population change in both countries, largely because of rising gender imbalances, changing 
social attitudes towards reproduction and family structure and the uncertain impacts of policy 
responses.
7
In China, while debates over the extent of fertility decline continue, it is widely accepted that 
by the turn of the century fertility rates had fallen to well below the replacement level of 2.1 
births per woman.  According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the total fertility rate in 2000 
was 1.22 children per woman, although even the Chinese government recognises that the true 
figure was more like 1.8 because of the incentive the policy creates to underreport births in 
surveys and censuses (Sharping, 2003).  Zhang and Zhao (2006) provide an extensive survey of 
the literature on fertility decline in China during the last two decades and conclude that the total 
fertility rate probably fell to around 1.6 by the year 2000.  There is no question that the One 
Child Policy has been fundamental in facilitating this decline.  Sharping (2003) controls for 
numerous other factors that affect population growth – including urbanisation, female education, 
increases in labour force participation and improved life expectancy, all of which would have 
contributed to declining fertility in China, regardless of its population policy – and estimates 
that, in the absence of the state’s birth control policies, China’s population would have been 1.6 
billion instead of the 1.27 billion reported at the end of the 20
th century. 
China’s One Child Policy has always been a highly controversial topic outside of China, and 
is now being openly challenged within China on the grounds of related ageing and gender 
imbalance issues.
8  The government is certainly prepared to consider the implications of higher 
fertility rates, as indicated by research conducted by the Development Research Centre of the 
State Council of China (2000), which projects population under a variety of fertility scenarios 
including a “two-child policy”.  Of course, it is impossible to know the extent to which such a 
policy would impact on actual future fertility rates.  According to Demeny (2003), in the past 
the family planning programs that have been most effective in reducing fertility rates in 
developing countries tended to work via “heavy-handed methods of persuasion, and, in the 
especially important case of China, by coercion backed by legal sanctions” (p. 14).  The Chinese 
government is very unlikely to utilise such methods to raise fertility rates in the future, and 
would instead need to resort to fiscal measures (such as tax breaks and family allowances) and 
                                                 
7 The gender issue is particularly critical in China, where the ratio of males to females in the 0-9 age group reached 
1147 per 1000 in the year 2000.  This is significantly higher than the ratio of 1092 per 1000 in the 10-19 age group, 
suggesting that the issue is getting worse, not better.  India’s ratio is also very high compared to international 
standards, with a ratio of 1058 males to 1000 females in the 0-9 age group in 2000, but at least this figure has fallen 
slightly from the ratio of 1070 to 1000 in the 10-19 age group.  See Padmadas et al. (2005) for further details. 
8 A Xinhuanet (2005) news article reported that a number of Chinese scholars challenged China’s family planning 
policy at a forum on China’s population and economy at Beijing University, where the main issues were the 
‘expanding grey generation’ and the gender issue.   
  6policies to make motherhood and the women’s labour force more compatible (through day-care 
services and more flexible work-hours).
9
Like China, India has also sought to restrict population growth, although the policy 
mechanisms have clearly differed.  India introduced a ‘target’ oriented family planning program 
in the early 1970s, using a range of incentives to promote sterilisation.  The initial sterilisation 
target was directed towards males but was ultimately deemed unsuccessful, because of political 
instability and administrative failures, with female sterilisation later emerging as the 
predominant method of contraception among Indian couples.  In 1996 the government adopted a 
target-free approach, relying on family planning services to promote the spacing of births, 
smaller families and improvements in female education and health (Padmadas et al. 2005).  
India has since entered a period of rapid fertility decline, particularly in the South where some 
states already had rates below replacement levels, which Sen (2000) cites as evidence that social 
policies can be more effective than administrative control measures.  Leaving aside this debate, 
it is clear that Indian fertility rates have declined in the last three decades, from 5.4 in 1970-75, 
dropping to 4.2 in 1985-90 and further to 3.1 in 2000-05 (United Nations, 2005). 
The question of interest here is the speed at which fertility rates will fall in the future.  The 
key factors impacting on India’s fertility rates are the age of first marriage, the uptake of family 
planning, especially sterilisation, and the vast discrepancies in levels across Indian states, where 
increases in the first two, and convergence in the latter will all contribute to future fertility 
declines (Padmadas et al., 2005).  Different assessments of the relative importance of these 
factors, along with different methods and data, have given rise to a wide range of forecasts 
regarding Indian fertility rates in the first three decades of the twenty-first century.  The “high 
fertility” variant of the UN (2005) population projections, for example, implies a total fertility 
rate that falls to 2.45 in 2025-30, while according to Dyson’s (2002) “low fertility” variant it 
will reach 1.59 by that time.
10  Any assessment of the implications of demographic change on 
India’s economy should therefore encompass this wide range of fertility outcomes.  To do so, 
however, requires a model that integrates the demography with the economics.  To this we now 
turn. 
 
3 Modelling Demographic and Economic Change 
  The approach adopted follows Tyers and Shi (2007), in that it encompasses demographic 
and economic change.  A complete demographic sub-model is integrated within a dynamic 
                                                 
9 See Demeny’s (2003) excellent discussion of population policy in low-fertility countries for further details. 
10 See Padmadas et al. (2005) for further details. 
  7numerical model of the global economy.  The economic model is a development of GTAP-
Dynamic, the standard version of which has single households in each region and therefore no 
demographic structure.
11  The version used has regional households with endogenous saving 
rates that are disaggregated by age group, gender and skill level. 
 
Demography: 
The demographic sub-model tracks populations in four age groups, two genders and two 
skill categories: a total of 16 population groups in each of the 14 regions listed in Table 1.
12  The 
four age groups are the dependent young, adults of fertile and working age, older working adults 
and the mostly-retired over 60s.  The skill subdivision is between households that provide 
production labour (unskilled) and those that provide professional labour (skilled).
13  Each age-
gender-skill group is a homogeneous sub-population with group-specific birth and death rates 
and rates of both immigration and emigration, as illustrated in Figure 1.
14  If the group spans T 
years, the survival rate to the next age group is the fraction 1/T of its population, after group-
specific deaths have been removed and its population has been adjusted for net migration. 
The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life expectancy at 60, which varies 
across genders and regions.  The key demographic parameters, then, are birth rates, sex ratios at 
birth, age-gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates and life expectancies at 60.  
Immigration and emigration are also age and gender specific.  The model represents a full 
matrix of global migration flows for each age and gender group.  Each of these flows is 
currently set at a constant proportion of the population of its destination group, though for 
skilled workers the underlying migration rates are sensitive to inter-regional real wage 
divergences.
15  The birth rates, life expectancy at 60 and the age specific mortality rates all trend 
through time asymptotically, as indicated in Tables 2-4.  For each age-gender group, and region, 
a target rate is identified.
16  The parameters then approach these target rates with initial growth 
rates determined by historical observation.  In particular, note the declining trend in Chinese 
fertility, indicated in Table 2, which extends the fall during the decade prior to the base year 
                                                 
11 The GTAP-Dynamic model is a development of its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel, 1997).  Its 
dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000). 
12 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in dependency ratios.  
For more complete documentation, see Chan and Tyers (2006). 
13 The subdivision between production and professional labour accords with the ILO’s occupation-based 
classification and is consistent with the labour division adopted in the GTAP Database.  See Liu et al. (1998). 
14 Mothers in families providing production labour are assumed to produce children who will grow up to also 
provide production labour, while the children of mothers in professional families are correspondingly assumed to 
become professional workers. 
15 See Tyers et al. (2006) for further details. 
16 In this discussion the skill index, s, is omitted because birth and death rates, and life expectancies at 60 do not 
vary by skill category in the version of the model used. 
  8(1997) in an asymptotic approach toward, but not reaching, the birth rate observed in Japan in 
that year.
17  For India, the base year fertility rate is 3.5 and it trends asymptotically to a target of 
2.56, slightly higher than the United Nation’s (2005) “high” population projection for India. 
A further key parameter is the rate at which each region’s education and social development 
institutions transform production worker families into professional worker families.  Each year a 
particular proportion of the population in each production worker age-gender group is 
transferred to professional (skilled) status.  These proportions depend on the regions’ levels of 
development, the associated capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of the 
production and professional labour groups.  The resulting rates of transformation are based on 
changes during the decade prior to the base year, 1997, in the composition of aggregate regional 
labour forces as between production and professional workers.  They are constant within each 




To evaluate the number of “full-time equivalent” workers we first construct labour force 
participation rates, by gender and age group for each region from ILO statistics on the 
“economically active population”.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are part-
time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work.  The result is 
the number of full-time equivalents per worker.
19  For each age-gender group and region, a 
target country is identified whose participation rate is approached asymptotically.  As with birth 
and death rates, the rate of this approach is determined by the initial rate of change.  Target rates 
are chosen from countries considered “advanced” in terms of trends in participation rates.  
Where female participation rates are rising, therefore, Norway provides a commonly chosen 
target because its female labour force participation rates are higher than for other countries.
20
For China, India and comparator nation, Japan, the trends in labour force participation rates 
are summarised in Table 5.  China’s aged labour force participation rises slightly to allow for the 
expected shortfall in pension income as more retirees leave private sector employment.
21  This, 
                                                 
17 Since 1997 the Japanese fertility rate has fallen further, to 1.25.  These projections are slightly lower than those 
by the Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2000) and Sharping (2003), yet the latter two 
make no attempt to allow Chinese fertility to follow the declining trends observed in neighbouring countries. 
18 Note that, as regions become more advanced and populations in the production worker families become 
comparatively small, the skill transformation rate has a diminishing effect on the professional population.  These 
transformation rates are held constant in this analysis but it is made endogenous to real per capita incomes and to 
the skilled wage premium in Tyers, Bain and Vedi (2006). 
19 See Tyers et al. (2005: Tables 11 and 12) for further details. 
20 The resulting participation rates are listed by Chan and Tyers (2006: Table 10). 
21 This differs from the assumption of constant aged labour force participation rates made in Golley and Tyers 
(2006). 
  9combined with the effects of ageing, raises the trend of the labour force above that of the 
population, as indicated in Figure 2.  Both India and Japan have substantially higher aged 
participation rates, lacking China’s central planning history.  The other striking pattern is that 
India’s female labour force participation rates are considerably lower in the 15-59 age groups 
than those in either China or Japan.  This reduces India’s recorded labour force relative to that of 
China. 
 
The baseline population projections for China and India: 
The baseline population and labour force projections for both China and India are illustrated 
in Figure 2 and the associated changes in the age and gender structure of each are summarised in 
Table 6.  A dramatic contrast between the projections for China and India is clear from Figure 2  
While the Chinese labour force falls short of a 10% increase over the three decades, and declines 
after 2015, the Indian labour force grows strongly with expansion continuing beyond 2030.  
This contrast is primarily due to the relative youth of India’s population and its higher initial 
fertility rate.  Even though the two populations are projected to reach rough parity in 2030, the 
Indian labour force remains smaller, due mainly to lower female participation rates.  
Accordingly, the projected Indian labour force has proportionally more male workers.   
Interestingly, the more rapid ageing of the Chinese population notwithstanding, the projected 
labour forces of the two nations maintain very similar proportions of older workers.  Lower 
female participation rates notwithstanding, this is explained by India’s comparatively high 
participation rates of 60+ workers, which are close to double China’s for both men and women. 
 
The Global Economic Model 
GTAP-Dynamic is a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world 
economy.  Money is not included and the prices of goods and assets are set relative to a global 
numeraire.  In the version used, the world is subdivided, consistent with the demographic sub-
model, into the 14 regions indicated in Table 1.  Industries are aggregated into just three sectors, 
food (including processed foods), industry (mining and manufacturing) and services.  To reflect 
composition differences between regions, these products are differentiated by region of origin, 
meaning that the “food” produced in one region is not the same as that produced in others.  
Consumers substitute imperfectly between foods from different regions. 
As in other dynamic models of the global economy, in GTAP-Dynamic the endogenous 
component of simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  Technical change is 
introduced in the form of exogenous productivity growth that is sector and factor specific.  Skill 
  10(or human capital) acquisition is driven by the constant transformation rates of production into 
skilled worker households introduced in the previous section.  A consequence of its capital 
accumulation dynamics is the property of all dynamic models of the Solow-Swan type that 
incorporate diminishing returns to factor use, namely that an increase in the growth rate of the 
population raises the growth rate of real GDP but reduces the level of real per capita income.   
What distinguishes the model from this simpler progenitor is the endogeneity of saving rates and 
its multi-regional structure.  All regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive 
expectations about real regional net rates of return on installed capital.  These drive the 
distribution of investment across regions.  In each, the level of investment is determined by a 
comparison of net rates of return on domestic installed capital with borrowing rates yielded by a 
global trust, to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted by calibrated region-specific 
interest premia. 
To capture the full effects of demographic change, including those of ageing, the standard 
model has been modified to include multiple age, gender and skill groups in line with the 
structure of the demographic sub-model.  In the complete model, these 16 groups differ in their 
shares of regional disposable incomes, consumption preferences, saving rates and their labour 
supply behaviour.  While the consumption-savings choice differs for each age-gender group, it 
is dependent for all on group-specific real per capita disposable income and the real lending rate.  
Governments balance their budgets while private groups save or borrow.
22  The high initial rates 
for the elderly are partly due to the complication that a comparatively large proportion of 
consumption spending by the Chinese elderly is probably financed from the income of younger 
family members but it also reflects high pension payments to retirees from SOEs.
23
 
4 Constructing the Baseline Economic Scenario 
The baseline scenario represents a “business as usual” projection of the global economy 
through 2030.  Although policy analysis can be sensitive to the content of this scenario, our 
focus is the extent of departures associated with alternative assumptions about demographic 
change in China and India.  Nonetheless, it is instructive to describe the baseline, not only 
because it has some limited forecasting value but primarily because all scenarios have a 
                                                 
22 Unlike the standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private consumption, government 
consumption and total saving via an upper level Cobb-Douglas utility function that implies fixed regional saving 
rates, this adaptation first divides regional incomes between government consumption and total private disposable 
income and then allows endogeneity of group saving rates depending on real disposable income levels and real 
interest rates. 
23  New research by Kinugasa and Mason (2005) and Feng and Mason (2005) offers useful results on the 
relationship between age and saving in China. 
  11common a set of assumptions about future trends in key exogenous variables and because some 
exposition of the baseline makes the construction of departures from it clearer. 
 
Shifts in consumption-saving preferences 
  Consumption-saving preferences are represented by age-gender specific consumption 
equations that relate real per capita consumption to real per capita income and the real lending 
rate in each region.  There is no endogeneity of saving rates to longevity even though death rates 
decline through time and 60+ life expectancy increases in both nations, as indicated in Tables 3 
and 4.
24  Consumption-saving preferences are shifted through time, however, in the few regions 
where changes are expected to stem from developments not represented in the model.  Baselines 
saving rates for four regions are listed in Table 7.  Aged saving rates in East Asia are projected 
to decline.  Unlike the aged dissaving of Europe and North America, the aged of Asia are 
positive savers, due to high aged labour force participation rates and the mixing of incomes in 
extended families.  In Japan, aged participation rates are the highest in the industrialised world 
and unlikely to increase.  As Japanese family sizes fall, their aged saving rates there are likely to 
trend toward European levels.  In the case of China, the 60+ age group has low labour force 
participation but high state-financed retirement incomes.  Because the proportion of the aged 
retiring on relatively generous state pensions is declining, the 60+ groups are assumed to have 
underlying saving rates that fall through time.  There is no a priori reason to think that India’s 
underlying saving rates will rise or fall and so these are held constant. 
 
Exogenous factor productivity growth 
The model simulates growth due to the accumulation of labour, skill and physical capital.  
Other sources of growth, including all that passes for “technical change”, are introduced via 
exogenous productivity growth shocks.  These are applied separately for each of the model’s 
five factors of production (land, physical capital, natural resources, production labour and 
professional labour).  The overall rate of economic growth proves quite sensitive to these 
exogenous shocks since the larger these are for a particular region the larger is that region’s 
marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys higher levels of investment and hence 
a double boost to its per capita real income growth rate.
25  Baseline agricultural productivity is 
assumed to grow more rapidly than that in the other sectors in China, along with Australia, 
                                                 
24 This endogeneity is suggested by Bloom and Canning (2005b). 
25 The importance of productivity notwithstanding, the empirical literature is inconsistent as to whether productivity 
growth has been faster in agriculture, manufacturing or services and whether the gains in any sector have enhanced 
all primary factors or merely production labour.  The factor productivity growth rates assumed in all scenarios are 
drawn from (Tyers et al. 2005). 
  12Indonesia, Other East Asia, India and Other South Asia.  This allows continued shedding of 
labour to the other sectors.
26  In the other industrialised regions, the process of labour relocation 
has slowed down and labour productivity growth is slower in agriculture.  In the other 
developing regions, the relocation of workers from agriculture has tended not to be so rapid.  
Labour productivity in services is particularly difficult to measure.  In general, baseline 
productivity growth rates in services are assumed to be slower than in the tradable goods sectors 
in all regions.  The baseline values of each productivity growth rate for China and India are 
given in Table 8. 
 
Interest premia 
The standard GTAP-Dynamic model takes no explicit account of financial market maturity 
or investment risk and so tends to allocate investment to regions that have growing marginal 
products of physical capital.  These tend to be labour-abundant developing countries with still 
rapidly expanding labour forces.  Although the raw model finds these regions attractive 
prospects for this reason, we know that considerations of financial market segmentation, depth 
and risk limit the flow of foreign investment at present and that these are likely to remain 
important in the future.  To account for this we have constructed a “pre-base” simulation in 
which we set the relative growth rates of investment across regions as exogenous.  This allows 
us to capture the implied investment premium changes between the base year, 1997, and 2005, 
for which we have data on actual investment patterns.  Thereafter, of course, while the pre-base 
path of investment in each region remains exogenous values are judgemental.  Global 
investment rises and falls depending on the level of global savings, but its allocation between 
regions is thus controlled.  To do this the interest premium variable (GTAP Dynamic variable 
SDRORT) is made endogenous.  This creates wedges between international and regional 
borrowing rates.  The results from the pre-baseline simulation show high interest premia for the 
populous developing regions of Indonesia, India, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.  In 
regions where labour forces are falling or growing more slowly premia fall through time. 
Most significant is a secular fall in the Chinese premium.  This is because the pre-base 
simulation incorporates the extraordinary rise in Chinese investment of the 2000-2005 period 
and allows it to continue growing in real terms, albeit at declining rates thereafter 
notwithstanding the eventual decline in China’s labour force.  On average, Chinese investment 
                                                 
26 Wang and Ding (2006) have recently estimated that there are 40 million surplus workers in China’s agricultural 
sector.  While underemployment is not explicit in our model, the assumption of high labour productivity growth in 
agriculture implies that agriculture is capable of shedding labour more quickly than in other sectors.  This 
essentially mimics the surplus labour problem, which is thereby accounted for implicitly. 
  13is financed at an initial rate substantially above the Chinese government’s long term bond rate 
(which exceeds the corresponding US rate by 40 per cent).  The pre-base path of China’s 
domestic interest rate declines initially, wiping out most of the initial Chinese premium.
27  This 
has the important consequence that the rental price of physical capital in China declines in the 
early years of the pre-base simulation.  In the case of India, the pre-base domestic interest rate is 
stable through time.  Since the global interest rate rises gradually, this implies a decline in its 
interest premium, though one that is less spectacular than for China.  India’s capital rental rate is 
nonetheless stable through time while those of the industrial economies, with more open capital 
markets, are rising with the global interest rate.  Relatively competitive capital costs are 
therefore factors leading both economies to have advantageously depreciating real exchange 
rates.
28
Once the regional interest premia are calibrated, they are rendered exogenous while actual 
investment in each region is made endogenous.  The baseline simulation is then constructed, 
yielding results that are identical with the pre-baseline simulation but which then form the basis 
for comparison with subsequent simulations in which Chinese and Indian fertility levels are 
altered. 
 
The baseline projection 
Overall baseline economic performance is suggested by Table 9, which details the average 
GDP and real per capita income growth performance of each region from 1997 to 2030.  In part 
because of its comparatively young population and hence its continuing rapid labour force 
growth, India attracts substantial new investment and, as shown in Figure 3, is projected to take 
over from China as the world’s most rapidly expanding region.  Rapid population growth 
detracts from India’s long term real per capita income performance, however.  By this criterion, 
China is the strongest performing region through the three decades.  “Other East Asia” is also a 
strong performer, while the older industrial economies continue to grow more slowly.  The 
emphasis hereafter is on quantifying the departures from this baseline projection due to changes 
in Chinese and Indian fertility. 
 
5. Alternative Fertility Policies 
  The alternative scenario considered for China is a path toward a two-child policy.  That 
for India is a fertility decline which is faster than our baseline assumption.  The effect of each is 
                                                 
27 See Tyers and Golley (2006) for further details. 
28 For an analysis using the same model of real exchange rates and their determinants, see Tyers et al. (2006). 
  14described in turn and, for the economic bottom line, a set of elasticities is constructed that 
enable the two scenarios to be compared. 
 
A Two-Child Policy for China 
Following Sharping (2003) and the Development Research Centre of the State Council 
of China (2000), a higher-fertility scenario is constructed that, unlike the baseline, which has 
declining Chinese fertility, offers an asymptotic trend toward a fertility rate of 2.3.  It is similar 
to the State Council’s “two-child policy” and to Sharping’s “delayed two-child policy”.  The 
implications for China’s total population are indicated in Table 10.  The correspondence 
between our model simulations and State Council projections is close.  A transition to a two-
child policy would raise the 2030 population by 19% relative to the baseline.  The implications 
for population and labour force growth are displayed graphically in Figure 4.  Critically, the path 
of China’s labour force shifts up by substantially less than that of its population.  By 2030, the 
labour force is larger by 13% and the population by 21%.  This is because higher fertility first 
enlarges the youth population, which does not contribute to the labour force.  The Chinese 
population continues to age, however, though more slowly with the higher fertility rate.  This 
can be seen from the non-working-aged dependency ratio in Figure 5.  After 2015 there are 
discernable differences, with the two-child policy yielding a 2030 ratio that is lower by four 
percentage points than the low-fertility baseline.  As the diagram shows clearly, however, rising 
youth dependency dominates declining aged dependency, ensuring that the total dependency 
rate is higher throughout the period. 
The economic effects of this change bear out the generalisations of Section 2, above.  In 
particular, the supply side labour force effects are dominant.  The anticipated supply side story is 
that he labour force expands, increasing capital productivity and therefore the return on Chinese 
investment.  This attracts more of the world’s savings into China so that its capital stock grows 
more rapidly.  China’s GDP might therefore be expected to be boosted substantially by 
increased fertility, through its direct and indirect influence over the supply of the two main 
factors of production, labour and capital.
29  In per capita terms, however, three forces would 
conspire to ensure that the average Chinese bears an economic cost.  First, the Solow-Swan 
predisposition, due to diminishing marginal returns, toward slower real wage growth would tend 
to slow the growth of income per capita.  Second, the associated shift in the age distribution 
would cause a rise in dependency (a loss of “demographic dividend”) and hence a further 
                                                 
29 This result could have a number of economic implications that are not captured in our model, including that 
higher fertility might reduce pressure on fiscal policy and so the growth-retarding effects of tax distortions might be 
reduced.  Our scenarios maintain constant tax rates and fiscal deficits. 
  15slowing of per capita income growth.  Finally, because much of the new capital stems from 
foreign investment, there is the need to reward its foreign owners. 
  These expectations are indeed borne out in our simulations, as indicated in Table 11.  
The labour force increase is associated with a small decline in the skill intensity, due in part to 
the emigration of more internationally mobile skilled workers, which is boosted by lower skilled 
wages relative to destination regions.
30  The rate of return on installed capital in China is raised 
and so, therefore, is the level of investment and the growth in the physical capital stock.  Yet, 
because the original stimulus is labour force expansion, this is insufficient to prevent a decline 
in labour productivity and hence in real wages.  The terms of trade deteriorates slightly due to 
the expansion in China’s core factors of production and the associated rise in the volume of 
exports more than imports.  Alternatively, it can be seen as a real depreciation, brought about a 
lower time path of labour costs. 
In the end, China’s 2030 GDP is higher by 11% compared with the baseline, as is also 
shown in Figure 6.  Yet the faster growth this represents is still not sufficient to keep pace with 
India’s baseline growth rates.
31  And the rise in dependency, the slowdown in real wage growth, 
the repatriation abroad of an increased proportion of the income accruing to capital, the small 
addition to skilled emigration and the terms of trade deterioration all conspire to slow the rate of 
growth in real per capita income.  By 2030 it is smaller than the baseline by 10%.  This 




Lower Fertility in India 
The low fertility scenario for India embodies a fall in the total fertility rate to 1.55 by 2030, 
compared with 2.55 in the baseline simulation.  It reduces fertility by 1 child per woman.  The 
simulation is therefore similar to Dyson’s (2002) “low fertility” variant cited in Section 2.  As 
shown in Figure 4, it offers substantial slowdowns in both the population and the labour force, 
with both tending to stabilise by around 2030.  As in the fertility shock to China, above, the 
effect on the labour force is proportionally smaller than that on the population.  As then, this is 
because fertility changes first affect the youth population and not those of working age.  In 
                                                 
30 This effect is too small to give it more space here.  More details about the migration behaviour embodied in the 
model are provided by Tyers et al. (2006). 
31 Even with the 2 child policy in China and lower fertility in China, India’s 2030 growth rate is faster by 1.2 %/yr. 
32 Empirical evidence for such terms of trade effects from growth is variable.  In many cases, developing country 
expansions have not caused adverse shifts in their terms of trade because their trade has embraced new products and 
quality ladders in ways not captured by our model.  See the literature on the developing country exports fallacy of 
composition argument, that includes Lewis (1952), Grilli and Yang (1988), Martin (1993), Singer (1998) and 
Mayer (2003). 
  16contrast with China, however, in India the difference is made larger by its young population, its 
large population of women of fertile age and its high aged labour force participation rates.  The 
diminished slowing impact on the labour force results in a substantial decline in the total 
dependency ratio, which is the combination of a minimal rise in non-working aged dependency 
combined with a dramatic decline in youth dependency, as shown in Figure 5. 
The economic implications of this are indicated in Figure 6 and Table 12.  Slower labour 
force growth yields slower capital productivity growth and therefore slower investment and 
capital accumulation.  With slower primary factor accumulation comes slower GDP growth - 
real GDP reaches a 2030 level that is 7% lower than the baseline.  By contrast with China’s 
fertility increase, however, the forces influencing real per capita income are all positive.  
Dependency is substantially lower, the Solow-Swan effect sees real wages grow faster, the 
repatriation of capital income to foreign owners is less, there is less skilled emigration and the 
terms of trade improves.  The latter improvement is due to increased consumption relative to 
GDP and therefore increased imports relative to exports.  Alternatively, it is due to higher wage 
costs and a slight real appreciation relative to the baseline.  In per capita terms, then, the Solow-
Swan predisposition toward inverse proportionality between population and per capita income 
growth is amplified here.  Even though aged dependency rises slightly, overall dependency falls 
substantially and slower population growth makes the average Indian better off.  By 2030, the 
cost in GDP is 7% relative to the baseline but the gain in real per capita income is 15%. 
 
Comparing the Implications of Fertility Change in China and India 
A glance at Figure 6 reveals that, by 2030, the cost of 10% more GDP is about the same in 
real per capita income.  In India, by contrast, 15% more real per capita income can be gained 
through fertility decline at the expense of only 7% of GDP.  To clarify this asymmetry, we 
extract the elasticities of GDP and per capita income to the target fertility rate – that rate toward 
which fertility is assumed to trend asymptotically.
33  This yields unitless measures that are 
independent of the directions of the fertility shocks.  As shown in Figure 7, these elasticities 
change through time, because, following a shock to the target fertility rate, the economic 
implications enlarge with departures from the baseline population and labour force.  While the 
effects of fertility change on GDP are found to be very similar for the two countries, those on 
income per capita are widely divergent.  The cost in per capita terms of raising fertility in India 
is more than twice as large is in China.  This stems primarily from India’s comparatively young 
                                                 
33 Virtually the same result emerges when the contemporaneous fertility rate is used. 




  Within the next decade, China’s labour force will begin to contract, while that of India 
will expand faster than its population.  A straight-forward consideration of this in a neoclassical 
model with diminishing factor returns leads to the expectation that the impact of these changes 
will be lower GDP and higher per capita income growth in China, and the reverse in India, and 
this general pattern does emerge from the analysis provided above.  However, the story is 
considerably more complex than this.  In particular, population structure plays a critical role in 
determining the relative magnitudes of labour force growth to total population growth and the 
consequent change in dependency ratios, which in turn impact significantly on per capita GDP 
growth.  Moreover, real wage trends influence skilled emigration from these regions and 
therefore the skill composition of their labour forces.  With increasingly open capital accounts, 
other things equal, both countries stand to attract more foreign investment the faster their labour 
forces grow.  This complements the positive association between fertility and GDP but the 
necessity to compensate foreign capital owners detracts from the per capita income result.  
Finally, faster GDP growth tends to shift the terms of trade adversely, which also detracts from 
per capita performance.  Our integrated model of global demography and economic growth 
offers some insight into all of these complexities. 
  A relaxation of the One Child Policy has been proposed by some as a way of combating 
the negative impact that the slowdown and ageing of China’s population will have on GDP 
growth in the future.  Our simulations indicate that a 2-child policy would indeed achieve the 
twin goals of increasing GDP and reducing the proportion of the aged population (from 21% to 
18%) and by similar proportion, the aged dependency ratio.  They also imply, however, that per 
capita income by 2030 would be reduced by almost as much as GDP would rise, a result that 
stems primarily from an associated large rise in the youth dependency ratio as well as from 
adverse changes in skilled emigration, capital income repatriation and the terms of trade.  If 
higher fertility rates are considered desirable for China to achieve its GDP growth and other 
(libertarian) objectives, policy efforts will need to be directed towards mitigating the negative 
impact of higher population growth on per capita income by raising labour market participation 
rates and increasing retirement ages. 
  With India set to become the world’s most populous country by around 2030, its 
population policy continues to be directed towards promoting fertility decline.  While our 
  18simulations demonstrated that faster fertility decline would necessarily lead to lower GDP 
growth, they also indicate that the benefits in terms of per capita income could be substantial.  
While lower fertility reduces GDP and increases per capita income in both countries, India gains 
substantially more per capita income than China per unit change in fertility, a result that depends 
critically on India’s higher youth dependency.  India therefore has considerably more to gain, at 
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Figure 1: The Demographic Sub-Model 
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Figure 2: China’s and India’s Projected Populations and Labour Forces
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a  These are cumulative % departures from the base year 1997, drawn from the baseline simulation in which 






















a  These are annual growth rates of real GDP.  They diverge in the later years due to slower labour force 
growth in China.  
Figure 4: Population and Labour Force: Alternative Scenarios
a 
 


























Lower fertility labour force
 
























1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Baseline total
Total





        a  These are the simulated ratios of the total population, the total youth population (0-15) and the non-working aged population, to the full time equivalent labour force. 
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 Figure 6: GDP, Real Wages and Real per Capita Income 
Alternative Scenarios (% Departures from the Baseline)
a 









1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Skilled real wage
Unskilled real wage











1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Skilled real wage
Unskilled real wage
Real per capita income
GDP
 















1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
China GDP
China per capita income
India GDP
India per capita income
 
a  These are the % changes in real GDP and real per capita income for each corresponding % change in 
the target fertility rate, calculated from the results in Figure 6 and from target fertility rate changes of 
59% for China and -37% for India. 




Table 1: Regional Composition in the Global Model 
Region  Composition of aggregates 
Australia  
North America  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Western Europe  European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but excluding 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union 
Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Japan  
China  Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Indonesia  
Other East Asia  Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
India  
Other South Asia  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Uruguay 
Middle East and Nth Africa  Includes Morocco through the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Sub-Saharan Africa  The rest of Africa 
Rest of World  Includes the rest of Central America, the rest of Indochina, the small 
Island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the 
Mediterranean Sea, Myanmar and Mongolia, New Zealand and the 
former Yugoslavia 
Source: The GTAP Global Database, Version 5. 
 
 
Table 2: Baseline Birth Rates in China, India and Japan
a 
 China  India  Japan 
Sex ratio at birth, M/Fs  1.10  1.08  1.06 












Base year, 1997  76  1.91 139 3.47  61  1.53 
                  2010  62  1.56 114 2.86  59  1.48 
                  2020  59  1.47 106 2.65  57  1.43 
                  2030  58  1.44 102 2.56  56  1.40 
a  Birth rates are based on UN estimates and projections as represented by the US Bureau of the Census.  The latter 
representation has annual changes in rates while the UN model has them stepped every five years.  Initial birth rates 
are obtained from the UN model by dividing the number of births per year by the number of females aged 15-39.  
These rates change through time according to annualised projections by the US Bureau of the Census. 
b  Birth rates are here defined as the number of births per year per thousand women of fertile age.  They are 
modified to allow for the modelling simplification that the fertile age group spans 15-39. 
c  Fertility rates are the average number of children borne by a woman throughout her life. 
Source:  Aggregated from United Nations (2003), US Department of Commerce- U.S. Bureau of the Census 
“International Data Base”, as compiled by Chan and Tyers (2006). 
 
 
  27Table 3: Age-Gender Specific Death Rates in China, India and Japan
a 
China India Japan  Deaths per 1000 
Males Females  Males Females Males Females 
     0-14          
          Initial (1997)  1.10 0.90 8.2  9.4 1.20  1.00 
          2030  0.54 0.49 3.8  4.5 0.72  0.66 
     15-39         
          Initial (1997)  0.80 0.30 2.4  2.4 0.70  0.40 
          2030  0.57 0.19 2.0  2.1 0.55  0.77 
     40-59         
          Initial (1997)  3.90 2.00  12.3  8.5 3.50  2.00 
          2030  2.81 1.78 7.6  5.7 2.60  1.39 
a  Projections of these parameters to 2020 assume convergence on target rates observed in comparatively 
“advanced” countries, as explained in the text.  Only the end point values are shown here but the model uses values 
that change with time along the path to convergence. 
Source:  Values to 1997 are from United Nations (2000) and WHO (2003). 
 
 
Table 4: Life Expectancy at 60 in China, India and Japan 
 
China India Japan  Deaths per 1000 
Males Females  Males Females Males Females 
Initial (1997)  16 18  15 18 22 26 
   2030  17 21  16 19 27 33 
a  Projections of these parameters to 2020 assume convergence on target rates observed in comparatively 
“advanced” countries, as explained in the text.  Only the end point values are shown here but the model uses values 
that change with time along the path to convergence. 
Source:  Values to 1997 are from United Nations (2000). 
 
 
Table 5: Age-Gender Specific Participation Rates in China, India and Japan, 
Base Year (1997) and Projected, 2030
a 
China India Japan  Full time equiv 
workers per person  Males Females  Males Females Males Females 
     15-39         
          Initial (1997)  0.79 0.60  0.81 0.35 0.77 0.55 
          2030  0.77 0.61  0.83 0.36 0.76 0.57 
     40-59         
          Initial (1997)  0.91 0.43  0.95 0.38 0.97 0.67 
          2030  0.93 0.45  0.96 0.40 0.97 0.68 
     60+         
          Initial (1997)  0.24 0.04  0.55 0.14 0.46 0.22 
          2030  0.27 0.08  0.55 0.15 0.52 0.25 
a  Projections of these parameters to 2020 assume convergence on target rates observed in comparatively 
“advanced” countries, as explained in the text.  Only the end point values are shown here but the model uses values 
that change with time along the path to convergence. 
Source:  Values to 1997 are from United Nations (2000) and WHO (2003). 
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Table 6: Baseline Population and Labour Force Structure in China and 
India
a
 China  India 
Population Millions  % 
Female 
% 60+  Millions  % 
Female 
% 60+ 
Initial (1997)  1272 48.5 9.7  955  48.2  6.9 
2010  1364 48.7  14.8 1146 48.4 10.6 
2020  1375 48.8  18.4 1263 48.5 13.0 
2030  1353 49.0  21.2 1349 48.5 14.8 
         
Labour Force     % 40+     % 40+ 
Initial (1997)  570 37.2  33.9 356 27.4  36.3 
2010  618 36.7  41.2 459 27.1  41.7 
2020  624 36.4  45.4 522 27.2  45.1 
2030  613 36.1  48.2 568 27.5  47.9 
a  The labour forces are measured in full time equivalent workers. 
Source: Projection using the baseline simulation of the model described in the text.  The labour forces are measured 




Table 7: Baseline Saving Rates from Personal Disposable Income, %
 
Per cent  15-39  40-59  60+ 
 Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female 
North America         
                          1997  14 14 19 19 -30 -30 
                          2030  14 14 19 19 -30 -30 
Japan         
                          1997  24 24 28 28 22  22 
                          2030  24 24 28 28 10  10 
China         
                          1997  35 35 40 40 31  31 
                          2030  53 35 40 40 10  10 
India         
                          1997  19 19 28 28 19  19 
                          2030  19 19 28 28 19  19 
Source:  These depend on initial values, compiled from studies of consumption behaviour on particular countries, 
including Mexico: Attanasio and Szekely (1998); Japan: Kitamura et al. (2001); New Zealand: Gibson and Scobie 
(2001); US: Attanasio et al. (1999), and on changes in real per capita disposable income and real lending rates that 
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Table 8:  Baseline Factor Productivity Growth in China, India, Japan and 
North America 










China             3.1 
  Food  1.8 5.0  7.0  1.6 0.0  3.6 
  Industrial products  0.0 4.0  8.5  1.6 0.7  3.2 
  Services  0.0 2.1  6.0  1.6 0.0  2.8 
India             2.3 
  Food  2.1 3.0  6.0  1.6 0.0  2.4 
  Industrial products  0.0 3.5  7.0  1.6 0.7  2.5 
  Services  0.0 2.0  4.0  1.6 0.0  2.0 
a  Productivity growth is specified by primary factor.  For display, sectoral averages are weighted by factor cost shares in each 
sector and regional averages by sectoral value added shares in each region. 




Table 9:  Baseline Real GDP and per Capita Income Projections to 2030 
% change 2030 over 1997  Implied average annual growth rate, 
%/yr 
 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Australia 401  275  5.0  4.1 
North America  350  255  4.7  3.9 
Western Europe  227  276  3.7  4.1 
Central Europe & FSU  337  331  4.6  4.5 
Japan 214  313  3.5  4.4 
China 743  578  6.7  6.0 
Indonesia 253  243  3.9  3.8 
Other East Asia  410  468  5.1  5.4 
India 892  435  7.2  5.2 
Other South Asia  424  157  5.1  2.9 
South America  267  205  4.0  3.4 
Mid East & Nth Africa  319  152  4.4  2.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  373  150  4.8  2.8 
Rest of World  498  277  5.6  4.1 




Table 10:  The Chinese Population: Baseline and Two Child Policy
a
Transition to 2 child policy
  Millions Baseline:  (declining) 
fertility: 1.91 to 1.45  State Council  Our model 
2000  1,252 1,270  1,257 
2010  1,311 1,369  1,369 
2020  1,321 1,466  1,462 
2030  1,296 1,518  1,536 
a  The base year for our simulations is 1997, when China’s fertility rate was approximately 1.91. 
b  Our Two Child Policy simulation matches the fertility assumptions by Sharping (2003). 
Source: Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2000) and simulations using the model 





Table 11: Economic Effects of Higher Chinese Fertility, 2030 
(% Departures of the 2-Child Policy from the baseline) 






























2010  1.95                      0.67 1.76 -0.26 -0.25 -0.65 0.41 0.05 0.04 1.15 -3.68
2020  7.77                     
                     
3.65 6.51 -0.70 -1.01 -2.10 1.11 0.09 -0.29 4.73 -6.77
2030  15.87 8.87 13.85 -1.07 -2.53 -4.02 1.56 0.11 -1.13 10.52 -9.46
  a  Skill intensity is the ratio of the skilled to the total labour force. 




Table 12: Economic Effects of Reduced Indian Fertility, 2030
a
(% Departures of the Indian low fertility scenario from the baseline) 






























2010  -1.06                      -0.32 -1.65 0.28 1.24 1.22 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.63 4.63
2020  -4.62                     
                     
-2.23 -5.92 0.76 3.42 3.92 -0.48 -0.08 0.67 -2.92 10.07
2030  -9.65 -6.04 -11.93 1.18 5.97 7.42 -1.35 -0.09 1.87 -6.86 15.45
  a  Skill intensity is the ratio of the skilled to the total labour force. 
  Source: The baseline and Low Indian Fertility projections from the model described in the text. 
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